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  ABSTRACT 
 
We propose a combination of region- and product-identification procedures in 
order to map the potential of economic activities in areas with poor infrastructure in an 
asymmetric  regional  integration.  After  identifying  spatial  units  with  relative 
backwardness  in  terms  of  infrastructure,  we  detect  the  most  competitive  exports, 
estimate gravity models for each of them and perform simulations for an improvement of 
20% in the value of the infrastructure index. In a final step, we identify goods/provinces 
where investment in infrastructure should be directed to. A thorough and data intensive 
application  is  made  to  the  case  of  the  Fondo  de  Convergencia  Estructural  del 
MERCOSUR  (FOCEM),  the  recently  created  cohesion  fund  of  one  of  the  most 
asymmetric integration projects. Our main conclusion is that FOCEM resources, under 
the global objective of enhancing structural convergence among the members, should 
be totally directed to Paraguay instead of being dispersed among all backward regions 
in the bloc. 
 
JEL: F15, H54, R58 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Asymmetries  are  a  serious  problem  in  regional  integrations.  The 
asymmetries rhetoric mixes however in the same bowl ingredients from distinct sources. 
Policies to deal with a given bloc‟s asymmetries should aim at those aspects of the 
problem related to the existence, functioning and deepening of the bloc itself, especially 
in what regards its strictest purpose; usually the building up of a customs union or a 
common  market.  Acceptance  of  this  point  allows  for  consideration  of  two  kinds  of 
asymmetries, relevant to the integration process: a) the ones related to public policies 
and b) structural asymmetries. 
 
The  mere  announcement  of  common  trade  policies,  for  the  future 
establishment  of  a  unified  market,  for  instance,  is  not  immediately  translated  into 
benefits.  Its  realization  requires  the  implementation  of  complementary  measures  to 
coordinate and harmonize individual, domestic public policies of member states. The 
implicit  application  of  measures  for  the  treatment  of  asymmetries,  through  the 
implementation  of  differentiated  periods  of  convergence,  lists  of  exceptions  and  the 
operation of different regimes of origin for the smaller partners does not usually achieve 
the expected results. 
 
As known, MERCOSUR suffers from an original sin as regards asymmetries: 
from  the  Brazilian  giant  to  the  tiny  Uruguay,  size  differences  –from  nearly  every 
viewpoint–  are  impressive,  making  even more  difficult  the already  slow  and  winding 
path  of  integration,  and  turning  the  bloc  into  a  model  example  of  the  problem.  If 
Paraguay and Uruguay are very small and, to a certain extent, poor economies, with 
respect to Brazil, they are not, on the other hand, the poorest spots in the integrated 
space. Continental Brazil,  with its huge income disparities, is the country where the 
poorest  areas  of  the bloc  are found,  the  size  and  complexity  of the Brazilian  social 
problem largely overtaking those of its fellow members.  
 
This has two important consequences. The first is that, though hoping that 
MERCOSUR  will  enhance  growth  and  improve  convergence  prospects  among  its 
members, it is unwise to expect the bloc to solve internal, deep structural problems that 
existed  before  its  creation.  Poverty  alleviation,  as  a  national  strategy,  will  have  to 
continue  to  be  a  national  issue,  reasonably  independent  of  the  common  policies. 
Secondly,  the  acute  Brazilian  problem  renders  senseless  any  global  asymmetries‟ 
strategy focusing purely on income disparities. 
 
In  MERCOSUR,  the  implementation  of  common  public  policies  aimed  at 
reducing inequalities in the less developed partners, as a result of the creation of the 
customs  union,  has  been  treated  implicitly,  and  constitutes  an  unsolved  issue. 
Concerning structural asymmetries, one of the important tools is the recently created 
Fondo  de  Convergencia  Estructural  del  MERCOSUR  –  FOCEM,  which  aims  at 
alleviating  somehow  the  discrepancies  among  the  four  members  by  way  of  target 
regional  investments,  projects  and  works  that  would  improve  the  socio-economic 
conditions of those less-favoured areas. Once such a fund exists, a key problem is how   
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to allocate its (scarce, in the case) resources. The issue is less simple than one might 
think because, as said, the poorest areas are found in the biggest member, Brazil, and 
using this as a single criterion would amount to channelling (back) most of the funds to 
the richest (though extremely unequal) member. This naturally raises the question of 
internally versus externally induced structural policies. Moreover, policies may also bear 
a predominant micro or macro character. Flôres (2008) and Baruj et al. (2008) have 
addressed part of these issues from a predominantly micro perspective. In this paper, 
taking instead a regional perspective, we outline how external policies would help in 
reducing asymmetries. 
 
It  is  for  the  above  reasons  that  we  have  chosen  to  analyse  the  regional 
disparities in terms of physical infrastructure, in order to build a range of priorities at the 
sub-regional  level,  where  the  degree  of  impact  of  improvements  in  physical 
infrastructure  would  be  measured  by  the  enhancements  in  export  performance.  Our 
analysis focuses  on a  raking  of  spatial units  with  relative  backwardness  in  terms  of 
infrastructure, as well as the identification of sectors/products, which could improve their 
export position through an intervention or financial support investments programmes in 
specific  infrastructure.  Ideally,  a  combination  of  both  identifications  (units/product), 
based  on  an  exercise  of  “mapping”  the  concentration  of  economic  activities  in 
disadvantaged  areas  in  terms  of  infrastructure  can  set  priorities  for  the  efficient 
allocation of funds for structural convergence. 
 
Several  works  have  already  studied  the  interaction  between,  on  the  one 
hand, the modifiable assets in the physical environment and in trade costs and, on the 
other hand, the levels and patterns of trade. Empirical papers, measuring the actual 
impact those features could provoke on bilateral flows, seem to have confirmed the 
various theoretical predictions. The present paper belongs to this strand of the literature. 
Its applied exercise addresses MERCOSUR regions‟ export performance, focusing on 
the  role  played  by  transport  costs  and  regional  infrastructure.  Moreover,  the  paper 
contributes  to  understanding  the  MERCOSUR  regional  reality  by  answering  the 
following questions: To what extent transport costs and regional infrastructure condition 
regional  export  performance?  May  infrastructure  enhancement  or  the  reduction  of 
transport  costs  effectively  help  in  changing  regional  competitiveness  and  market 
accessibility? And, under the event of solving bottlenecks to improve competitiveness, 
could regional common policies turn the otherwise irreversible destiny of less developed 
or disadvantaged MERCOSUR regions? 
 
The  methodology  here  developed  is  comprehensive  enough  and  can  be 
applied at different national and sub-national spaces. The application we present for the 
case of MERCOSUR should be taken as an illustration of how the proposed framework 
can be employed to derive useful policy suggestions. 
 
The  work  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  presents  a  review  of  the 
relationship between export performance and infrastructure in its conceptual framework, 
followed by theoretical and empirical issues which are the mainstay of the gravity model 
used in the analyses following the selection of products. In section 3 the methodological  
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steps  of  the  proposal  are  outlined.  Regional  data  as  well  as  methodological  issues 
concerning the application of the principal component analysis, which is the basis for 
identifying MERCOSUR units with relatively less developed physical infrastructure, are 
the subject of section 4. The next one goes deep into the application; it details the 
selection and estimation of the gravity equations to model the export performance of a 
select number of products exported by Paraguay and Uruguay, the ensuing simulations 
and  the  guidelines  for  identifying  products/sectors,  as  potential  recipients  of  funds. 
Finally,  section  6  presents  some  conclusions  and  a  suggestion  on  further  data 
initiatives. 
 
2.  EXPORT PERFORMANCE AND INFRASTRUCTURE: CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
In  the  last  twenty  years,  New  Trade  Theory  (NTT)  and  New  Economic 
Geography (NEG) have stressed the role played by market accessibility in determining 
the distribution of increasing returns to scale activities across regions. Further, recent 
theoretical extensions have proposed that regional export performance is driven by that 
basic force, which assumes a dual dimension when firms are vertically linked: the real 
access to purchasers for products local firms sell, and the real availability of suppliers 
for intermediates goods those firms use.
1 
 
Within  this  framew ork  two  elements  appear  as  principal  targets  when 
attempting  to  shape destiny:  trade  costs and  locally  settled  advantages.  Broadly 
interpreted, the former comprises all those features that limit or even preclude trade 
flows  such as the level of search costs, transport costs and the level of trade barriers. 
The latter corresponds to those modifiable assets that make local agents  particularly 
efficient, and thus more competitive, for producing and exporting certain goods. This is 
precisely the case of physical infrastructure, specially related to local transport, energy 
and communication. Needless to say, the lack of adequate physical infrastructure is at 
the origin of inefficient trade exchanges, affecting, consequently, the firms‟ competitive 
position. 
 
A  clear evidence  of  the  popularity  infrastructure  issues have  nowadays  is 
given by the multiplication of studies on infrastructure impacts and the proliferation of 
regional initiatives intended to develop infrastructure projects. We mention, for instance, 
the contributions of Estache and Fay (2007) reviewing current debates on infrastructure 
policy, and of Mu and van de Walle (2007), Grigoriou (2007) and Limi and Smith (2007) 
assessing the impacts of infrastructure improvements in Asian and African countries. As 
regards those initiatives, we can refer to the World Bank‟s and the African Development 
Bank‟s projects (Buys et al., 2006) and the Initiative for the Integration of the South 
American Regional Infrastructure (Vega Alvear, 2002; IIRSA, 2007), among others. 
 
                                                 
1 The adjective „real‟ indicates that both concepts, demand and supply access, acknowledge for the fact that the mass of 
customers/suppliers improve access (market size effect), while the number of competitors (competition or market-crowding effect) 
and the level of trade costs across regions may worsen it.   
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Previously,  though  the  importance  of  infrastructure  for  productivity  and 
economic  growth  had  been  widely  documented,  very  few  studies  explored  the  link 
between infrastructure and trade. One of those exceptions is Bougheas et al. (1999) 
who,  within  a  Dornbusch-Fischer-Samuelson  (1977)  -  Ricardian  model,  assume 
transport costs inversely depend on the level of infrastructure. 
  
Martin  and  Rogers  (1995)  pioneered  introducing  public  infrastructure  in  a 
NEG setting, where infrastructure is assumed to impose higher costs on trade and to 
comprise  “any  facility,  good, or institution provided by  the  state which  facilitates  the 
juncture between production and consumption” (page 336). The authors, who examine 
the impact of infrastructure on industrial location when trade integration takes place, find 
that firms tend to locate in countries with better domestic infrastructure; in addition, they 
uncover high levels of international infrastructure and strong increasing returns to scale 
magnify industrial relocation. Within a multi-country NTT set up, Behrens et al. (2007) 
explicitly  model  a  transport-cost  function  that  acknowledges  for  the  fact  that  firms 
choose  among  roads  minimising  transport  costs.  The  authors  conclude  that 
improvements in transportation infrastructure, which reduce trade costs, have spatially 
limited impacts. 
 
Baldwin  et  al.  (2003,  ch.  17)  present  a  growth  model  that  assumes 
infrastructure can affect both domestic and international trade costs. They find results 
for relocation, which are in line with those of Martin and Rogers, though exacerbated 
due to market-size endogeneity. In the same vein, with a NEG linear model that allows 
for domestic inequalities and labour mobility, Behrens (2004) concludes that whereas 
trade combined with poor domestic infrastructure may exacerbate spatial inequalities, 
better local infrastructure may favour a more balanced development. 
 
More recently, Combes and Lafourcade (2008) and Lafourcade and Paluzie 
(2008)  have  developed  novel  settings  for  addressing  these  issues.  The  former 
estimates a structural linear specification for France, in order to assess the impact of 
further intra-national integration on location. Theirs is a more sophisticated measure of 
transport  costs  instead  of  the  standard  proxies
2, and they conclude  that decreasing 
intra-national transport costs entail changes in inequality and that Paris should attract 
an increasingly large number of firms. A fall in France‟s inter-regional trade costs tends 
to foster domestic agglomeration, as well as intra-regional inequality. In the latter, the 
authors  investigate  whether  the  European  integration  process  has  changed  the 
geography of trade within France. By studying French regions between 1978 and 2000, 
they  find  that  French  border  regions  trade  on  average  72%  more  with  neighbour 
countries  than  do  interior  regions,  perform  better  if  they  have  good  cross-border 
transport connections, and are not so benefited with respect to other border regions if 
they are located in the periphery (western and southern) of Europe. Their innovative 
approach  highlights  the  importance  of  cross-border  transport  infrastructure.  It  is 
assumed that trade costs are composed of two elements: transport costs and specific 
cross-border costs; and that transport costs between any two regions depend on the 
                                                 
2 Indeed, the database they use provides the cost for a truck to connect any pair of EAs through the cheapest route on the real road 
transport network in 1993.  
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existence  (or  not)  of  cross-border  infrastructures,  while  specific  cross-border  costs 
include both tariffs and informal barriers. 
 
To  sum  up,  these  models  assume  –implicitly  or  explicitly–  infrastructure 
improvements are trade-cost reducing, and thus affect location, export performance and 
disparities across regions. They disregard, however, the role infrastructure may also 
play like an incentive (or a constraint) to the production process itself. For instance, 
Arrow  and  Kurz  (1970)  and  Barro  (1990)  stressed  the  substitutability  of  public 
infrastructure and private capital in the production function. The authors consider some 
public capital generate a flow of services which are comparable to productive services, 
such as transportation, water, electric power, etc. Other studies, like Holtz-Eakin and 
Lovely (1996), Bougheas et al. (2000), Justman et al. (2005), Brakman et al. (2002) and 
Egger and Falkinger (2006), acknowledging that public infrastructure is an important 
aspect  of  competitive  location  policy,  sustain  that  it  directly  affects  firms‟ production 
costs. 
 
Within  the  empirical  arena,  during  the  last  decade  many  studies  have 
addressed the role played by infrastructure and trade costs as determinants of bilateral 
trade.  Bougheas  et  al.  (1999),  using  an  augmented  gravity  model  and  data  from 
European countries, find their two alternative infrastructure variables  i.e., the stock of 
public capital and the length of the motorway network  have a positive impact on the 
volume  of  trade.  Based  on  stylised  facts,  Limão  and  Venables  (2001)  propose  a 
transport-cost  specification  that  relies  on  transport  and  communication  infrastructure 
inside  both  trade  partners  and  transit  countries  together  with  other  country 
characteristics.  The  authors  regress  a  gravity  equation  for  bilateral  trade  where 
transport  costs  take  that  form,  finding  international  support  for  the  importance  of 
infrastructure  quality  as  a  determinant  of  trade  flows,  especially  for  landlocked 
countries. 
 
Nordås  and  Piermartini  (2004)  follow  a  similar  approach,  but  extend  it  to 
acknowledge for bilateral tariff rates, multilateral resistance indices and remoteness à la 
Anderson-van  Wincoop  (2003).  They  find  that  the  quality  of  infrastructure  has  a 
significant impact on bilateral flows, and that bilateral tariffs have a large and negative 
impact  on  them.  In  another  interesting  contribution,  Shepherd  and  Wilson  (2006) 
following Buys et al. (2006) examine the quality of the road network across a group of 
neighbouring countries.  
 
As  regards  articles  that  specifically  address  intra-country  location,  namely 
across  domestic  regions,  beyond  the  two  already  mentioned  studies  on  France, 
Overman  and  Winters  (2005,  2006)  use  employment  data  by  establishment  and 
international trade data by port to assess the trade effects of UK‟s accession to the 
European Economic Community on the location of manufacturing activities within the 
UK.  The  authors  find  that  the  change  operated  across  ports  –through  which  trade 
entered  and  exited  the  country–  modifies  market  access  and  external  competition 
across regions, hence asymmetrically affecting regional employment. Using Combes 
and Lafourcade (2008)‟s structural framework for Portuguese regions, Teixeira (2006)   
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finds that the expansion of the road network has not resulted in greater spatial equity; 
nonetheless a further expansion is likely to foster manufacturing dispersion. 
 
Summarising,  every  study  finds  infrastructure  –in  particular,  transport 
infrastructure–  has  a  significant  role  explaining  location  and  trade  performance.  In 
addition, they highlight some infrastructure improvements could exacerbate historical 
agglomeration  instead  of  fostering  greater  spatial  equity.  Albeit  the  relevance  this 
empirical literature seems to have, many studies have some weak points which deserve 
attention. For instance, some tend to rely on ad-hoc instead of „model-based‟ equations, 
and to use proxy variables which identification with the „true‟ variable is rather imperfect. 
Further, as it is highlighted by Shepherd and Wilson (2006), most studies do not take 
into  account  alternative  modes  of  transport  and  the  interactions  among  them.  The 
present paper tries to contribute to this strand of the literature. 
 
Reviewing applied studies carried out for Latin American countries, one finds 
they are scarce and pretty recent. Martinez-Zarzoso and Nowak-Lehmann (2003), who 
run a gravity equation including infrastructure indices, find support for the importance of 
the  importer‟s  infrastructure  in  trade  between  the  EU  and  MERCOSUR.  Applying  a 
similar  approach,  Acosta  et  al.  (2006)  conclude  that  the  infrastructure  stock  of  the 
countries in the Andean Community of Nations (CAN) is decisive in determining their 
trade  performance.  Mesquita  Moreira  (2007),  in  a  full-of-data  descriptive  (non-
gravitational) work, discusses the relative importance of infrastructure and policy-related 
trade costs in South America and their potential impacts on regional disparities and 
growth. 
 
Benedictis  et  al.  (2006)  go  beyond  their  predecessors  and  accomplish  a 
gravitational  study  where  sub-national  regions  are  explicitly  considered,  namely  the 
Ecuadorian provinces. Infrastructure emerges as an important determinant of provincial 
export performance. Also addressing intra-country location, Ferraz and Haddad (2008) 
applies  an  interstate  CGE  model for  Brazil  running  simulations  to  examine  how  the 
distribution  of  the  economic  activity  may  change  as  the  country  opens  up  to 
international  trade.  The  authors,  who  explicitly  model  regional  transport  sectors, 
maritime  transport  costs  and  regional  port  costs,  find  that  reductions  in  maritime 
transport costs and improvements in port efficiency are both important for regional trade 
performance, although import tariffs are yet the most important determinant of trade. 
Further, those infrastructure improvements seem to reinforce the centrality of the main 
industrial  core  in  the  country,  the  city  of  São  Paulo.  Finally,  Castro  and  Saslavsky 
(2009, ch. 3) and Granato (2008) study how provincial trade performance in Argentina 
has been affected with MERCOSUR enactment and which could have been the role 
played by regional infrastructure.  
 
In  the  macroeconomic  literature,  numerous  studies  have  individually 
assessed the impact a particular type of infrastructure has on economic growth. For 
example, Röller and Waverman (2001) analysed the impact of telecommunications in 
economic development. Fernald (1999), found a positive effect on productivity due to 
changes  in  road  infrastructure.  Similarly,  other  authors  have  combined  different  
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indicators  of  infrastructure  to  investigate  its  impact  on  economic  development  –see 
Hulten (1997), Limão and Venables (2001), Acosta et al. (2006). 
 
The  study  of  Calderon  and Serven  (2004) pointed out,  however,  the  high 
degree of correlation between various types of infrastructure (e.g. roads, electricity and 
telephones), making almost impossible the identification of the degree of contribution 
each  type  of  infrastructure  might  have  in  the  econometric  estimation.  The  authors 
adopted a different methodology based on principal component analysis for the purpose 
of capturing in a single index the likely effect of each infrastructure variable on growth. 
 
Lastly, those empirical studies that have examined the impact of the use of 
European cohesion funds (the only respectable example given the time intervals for the 
analysis) conclude that the cohesion funds have been influential in its goal of helping to 
convergence  between  nations,  but  agree  they  have  not  achieved  one  of  its  main 
objectives: reducing intraregional disparities. In this regard, a review of the literature on 
the topic of the effectiveness of European regional policies –see, among others, Molle 
(2007),  Bijvoet  and  Koopmans  (2004),  Rodriguez-Pose  and  Fratesi  (2004)  and 
Ederveen et al. (2002)– seem to indicate that the implementation of cohesion policy has 
failed to diminish, in a significant manner, the asymmetries within the European regions. 
 
The  explanations  advanced  by  the  literature  on  this  topic  suggest  that 
regional policies designed to attract economic activity in so-called peripheries, in order 
to reduce the circularity of agglomeration effects –as it follows from the NGE– to break 
in  this  manner,  regional  disparities,  are  a  complex  process  and  in  many  cases  are 
marked by failure. The reason given is that the peripheral regions lack a critical mass 
capable  of  retaining  economic  activities.  Within  this  context,  the  improvement  of 
infrastructure  in  remote  regions  might  facilitate  trade  between  the  periphery  and  a 
centre next door, making it the first to lose competitiveness and inducing a reorientation 
of economic activity towards the centre. Examples of these developments relating to the 
impact of investment in infrastructure (inter-regional and intra-regional) at the expense 
of the periphery have been noted, among others, by Puga (2002) and Forslid (2004). 
 
3.  THE METHODOLOGICAL PROPOSAL 
 
Trying to make a synthesis of the above positions, the present paper draws 
on the NEG setting proposed by Granato (2008) which makes a theoretical distinction 
among  the  infrastructure  effects,  dividing  them  between  those  concerning  the  firms‟ 
production functions and those directly connected with interregional trade. The basic 
model  an extension of Robert-Nicoud (2002, 2006)‟s   deals with the location of both 
final goods and intermediate input producers. Thus, it assumes monopolistic firms are 
vertically linked and the productive factor entering fixed costs is inter-regionally mobile; 
Herscker-Ohlin comparative advantage is allowed across regions and a transport-cost 
function  à  la  Behrens  et  al.  (2007)  is  introduced.  The  model  displays  the  two   
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mechanisms for profit equalisation across regions that characterised alternative NEG 
models: re-localisation of firms and adjustments through production costs.
3 
 
In the inevitable comparison with the European reality, the experience of the 
MERCOSUR  integration  presents  potential  risks  of  desertification,  a  phenomenon 
clearly  due  to  the  Brazilian  asymmetries  and  the  existence  of  a  limited  number  of 
powerful centripetal agglomerations - mainly São Paulo, and less so Porto Alegre, Rio 
de Janeiro and Buenos Aires (the only agglomeration of magnitude, outside Brazil). This 
disparity in terms of concentration of economic activity has no parallel in Europe, with a 
more equal distribution of economic activities. It renders impractical the application of 
criteria for the allocation of funds for individual eligible regions exhibiting, for instance, 
development indicators below 75% of the average MERCOSUR values. In such event, it 
would take several FOCEMs to meet the needs of the poorer regions. Moreover, the 
difficulties of establishing selection criteria are magnified. Since most indicators use a 
blurred combination of the concept of development based both on social and economic 
indexes, a region rich in economic terms could present weak indicators of access to 
health  and  education,  and  vice  versa.  An  alternative  solution  would  be  the  use  of 
synthetic indices, able to condense economic, infrastructure or social indicators. 
 
This is precisely the idea implemented in this work, where a characterization 
of the spatial units builds on an infrastructure index, summarizing in a single indicator 
the  total  economic-physical  infrastructure  endowment.  The  rationality  of  focusing  on 
traditional indicators of physical infrastructure is based on the fact that these are directly 
linked  to  what  might be  recognized  as  an integration effect:  enhanced  exports. The 
inclusion of other types of capital would have provided a valuable input in the analysis, 
making however the judgment of the cause-effect links an extremely complex exercise. 
 
The first step then is a ranking of regions in the bloc, according to the values 
of the synthetic infrastructure index. The bottom regions are the potential candidates for 
help. This result is combined with information on export potential at the product level (5-
digits),  in  order  to  provide  additional  information  to  be  used  as  a  valid  criterion  for 
allocating  the  integration  resources.  The  starting  point  now  is  to  select  a  range  of 
sustainable products
4 with export potential (for Paraguay and Uruguay, in our example), 
and next to estimate a gravity model, for each of the correspondingly chosen exports. 
Finally, each models‟ coefficients are used to predict the increase in exports of these 
very products as a result of improved physical infrastructure or a reduction in transport 
costs.  
 
                                                 
3 That is, the distribution of production across the space is endogenously determined by two simultaneous processes: 
firms relocate into those regions with higher operating profits while production costs increase in more agglomerated 
areas. 
4 The criteria applied to select products with export potential for Uruguay and Paraguay is as follows: In a first step, we used trade 
data for both countries and their major trade partners (MERCOSUR partners, Mexico, USA, China and members of the EU-15) to 
construct a trade complementarity index (TCI) . Trade data used in this step was collected from COMTRADE -2005 --coded up to 
five digits of the SITC, rev.3 classification-- extracted through the WITS-system. In a second step, products having a TCI>1 and a 
representative share within the total exports of the respective country were selected. Additionally to complement these criteria, 
selected products were analyzed by stage of production to evaluate their dynamism into global chains of production.  (See Calfat et 
al 2008b)  
  14 – IOB Working Paper / 2010.05  Policy making in asymmetric regional integrationsr   
We use an extended gravity equation along the lines of Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003), considering as well the methodological hints raised by Baldwin and 
Taglioni (2006). In this vein, and relying on a complete and careful data scrutiny of the 
MERCOSUR  regions,  the  paper  studies  whether  transport  costs  and  regional 
infrastructure are relevant determinants of export performance at the regional level. 
 
The estimation of our extended gravity model is undertaken at  a product 
level using panel data from 2003-2005. For the case of Argentina and Brazil trade data 
was available at a provincial and state level. This was not the case for Uruguay and 
Paraguay  for  which  trade  flows  are  recorded  at  a  national  level  only.  Nevertheless, 
since both countries are relatively small, with industrial activity highly concentrated into 
their capital cities and considering that most of their trade is shipped through specific 
gateways, we have attempted to  circumvent   these data constraints by considering 
them as big regions of MERCOSUR. Hence, observations of 53 MERCOSUR‟s regions 
and their main trading partners (21) were taken into account for the selected samples at 
product level. It is worth to notice that sample size for each product varies as not all 
MERCOSUR‟s regions exhibit the same trade pattern. Moreover, even though a total of 
30 products were selected, estimations were only performed for those cases in which 
the number of observations was representative. 
 
Furthermore  for  estimation  purposes  and  to  account  for  changes  on  the 
stocks of infrastructure through time, new infrastructure indices were computed for each 
of the 53 units of MERCOSUR. In this respect, annual observations for each one of the 
stocks of infrastructure considered (paved roads, electricity consumption per capita and 
phone lines) jointly with the coefficients obtained from the Principal Component analysis 
(see equation 1) were used.  
 
The estimation of gravity models allows to arrive at a kind of counterfactual 
result  to  figure  out  what  would  had  been  the  export  performance  of  a  „without 
asymmetries‟-integration, had no changes occurred in the physical infrastructure or in 
transportation  costs. The  results  of the  simulations  thus  set an  indicative  ranking of 
products  able  to  further  expand  exports  as  a  result  of  a  20%  improvement  in  the 
physical infrastructure of the exporting region. 
 
The simultaneous identification of regions and products with export potential 
provides the input for determining the final allocations. 
 
4.   DATA AND BACKGROUND RESULTS 
 
4.1.   Regional Data 
 
The  establishment  of  a  database  of  spatial/regional  statistics  within  the 
MERCOSUR,  similar  to  the  NUTS  system  (Nomenclature  of  Territorial  Units  for 
Statistics)  used  by  EUROSTAT,  is  still  a  dream  to  come  through.  Because  of  this 
„statistical‟ reality, data collection of comparable indicators of infrastructure for cross-
regions is a daunting, frustrating and sometimes tortuous endeavour.   
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In an attempt to fix this “bug” in the official statistical landscape, we have 
compiled  a  systematic  and  fairly  comprehensive  collection  of  provincial,  state  or 
departmental level information at the regional level
5, in the hope to set up the basis for 
further work on the subject. 
 
4.2.   Measurement of Infrastructure 
 
On the threshold of the creation of the FOCEM, Hoste (2003), analysed the 
likelihood  of  applying  similar  criteria  to  assist  the  less  developed  members  in 
MERCOSUR,  drawing  a  parallel  with  the  criteria  for  assistance  to  disadvantaged 
regions implemented by the European Cohesion Fund. In his attempt to classify regions 
in  MERCOSUR  based  on  their  level  of  development,  the  author  focuses  on  the 
identification of three kinds of gaps in development indicators based on economic and 
social infrastructure. The author ends up computing twenty possible indicators in his 
analysis with the aim of establishing a ranking of regions according to their degree of 
development. 
 
This  effort,  worthy  and  valuable  in  its  parts,  lends  itself  to  complex 
interpretation as a whole due to methodological difficulties, as well as to the nature of 
the reality of MERCOSUR and its peculiar differences with the European experience. 
 
Based  on  the  approach  of  Serven  and  Calderon  (2003)  and  following 
Sanchez-Robles (1998), we construct an index of infrastructure for each of the regional 
units  (provinces,  states,  departments)  of  MERCOSUR  making  use  of  principal 
components analysis. 
 
Adopting  the  definition  to  characterise  physical  infrastructure  cited  by  the 
MERCOSUR  Secretariat  (2005),  as  being  related  to  transport,  energy  and 
communications, and depending on the availability of statistics for the countries studied, 
three have been the variables used in constructing the index: electricity consumption 
per capita (MW), number of telephones (fixed + mobile) per 1000 inhabitants and the 
length of paved roads (KM) normalized by total surface (km²) in the region. 
 
Data  availability  obliged  us  to  work  with  87  regions,  which  roughly 
correspond to the Brazilian states (27 regions), the Argentine provinces (24 regions), 
and  17  and  19  spatial  divisions  in  Paraguay  and  Uruguay,  respectively.  The 
observations refer to average indicators (2003-2005) for each infrastructure variables 
described above. 
 
                                                 
 For detailed information on the sources and data used in the construction of our regional infrastructure data base, we refer the 
reader to the annexes of the report prepared for the MERCOSUR Secretariat (Calfat et al., 2008a).  
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The results of the principal component analysis show that two components of 
our  three  measures  of  infrastructure  in  telecommunications,  roads  and  electricity 
account for 80% of the variation in these indicators. Furthermore, the three measures 
enter in the principal component analysis with similar weights. 
 
PC(Z)it=0,53 x proad + 0,56 x elecper + 0,64 x phones  (1) 
 
where PC(Z)it represents the first principal component; proad stands for the 
length of paved roads (kms) normalized by total surface (km²) of the region;  elecper 
corresponds to electricity consumption per capita (Megawatts); and phones symbolises 
number of telephones (fixed + mobile) per 1000 inhabitants. 
 
After carrying out the calculation of the infrastructure index, and in order to 
establish  a  comparative  analysis  of  the  existing  asymmetries  between  the  various 
regions, a ranking was prepared. Tables in Annex A.1 give the overall result, where the 
regions that occupy the top places are those which, in addition to improved physical 
infrastructure, have a relatively high per capita income. 
 
The  outcome  of  the  ranking  is  compelling  and  offers  a  rather  fair 
representation  of  the  regional  state  of  physical  infrastructure  in  MERCOSUR.  The 
Brazilian states of the Southern and Southeast regions, characterised with relatively 
high income levels, are represented in the upper section of the ranking. In Argentina, 
the top positions, as expected, include the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires and the 
provinces of Southern Patagonia, Chubut, Santa Cruz, Neuquén and Tierra del Fuego, 
characterized by production structures based on intensive use of natural non-renewable 
resources. Interestingly, the heading group also includes Catamarca, which along with 
San Luis, located in an overall twenty-second place, are typical cases of new economic 
developments with the support of provincial policies aimed at attracting investments in 
the region.  
 
The southern provinces of Uruguay, which concentrate the highest levels of 
economic activity, belong to the top ten of the MERCOSUR regions (with the exception 
of Colonia, which lies at the nineteenth position.). The highest Paraguayan region in 
terms  of  the  infrastructure  index  is  represented  by  Asunción  and  the  Central 
Department  (which  were  merged  as  one  region  for  the  purposes  of  calculating  the 
index). Furthermore, it is interesting to observe the location of the province of Buenos 
Aires in Argentina, which appears relatively far from the top. Two main reasons explain 
this position in the ranking: a) a clear abandonment of the physical infrastructure in the 
last  twenty  years,  b)  the  heterogeneity  of  this  province,  characterised  by  a  wide 
geographical  discrepancy  in  terms  of  basic  infrastructure.  The  latter  points  out  the 
direction of further improvements in the regional data base for MERCOSUR, similar to 
the European NUTS system. 
 
The  contrasting  situation  of  Uruguay  and  Paraguay  in  terms  of  physical 
infrastructure leaves little doubt in the event of identifying less favourable regions. A 
fragmentation of the global ranking into five sections would result in the inclusion of 11   
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Paraguayan departments, representing 60% of all its departments. In other words, 60% 
of all its departments, excluding the zone of Asuncion, come out as the MERCOSUR 
regions with the most limited physical infrastructure. 
 
The analysis of the Paraguayan departments in the bottom of the ranking 
does not allow a clear-cut distinction between border and interior regions. It is only the 
Alto Paraná department –known for its great dynamism and as a major producer of 
soybeans, corn, wheat and other oilseeds– as well as Misiones, which escape from the 
border regions of the latter group –the central department was already mentioned as 
among the top regions. In general, based on the rates of infrastructure for Paraguay, it 
may be inferred, unequivocally, that most of their departments suffer from inadequate 
physical infrastructure in relation to its MERCOSUR partners. 
 
This statistical finding is consistent with the Paraguayan official perception on 
the  asymmetries  in  MERCOSUR.
6  In  this  documen t  Paraguay  argues  for  the 
implementation of “aggressive and sustainable common market policies” as the only 
way out to resolve, in their opinion, their most important structural hindrance: “being a 
land lock nation”, ending its status as relatively less developed country. Clearly, a weak 
physical infrastructure can only further exacerbate the cost of being landlocked. The 
high toll resulting from the absence of coastline is further aggravated as a result of poor 
land  routes  connections  from  centres  of  economic  activity  to  gateways  to  foreign 
markets. Paraguay exports are mainly carried by truck to Argentina (66%) and Brazil 
(95%), while transportation to Uruguay is mainly made by waterway (88%) and the rest 
by road (Sánchez and Cipoletta Tomassian, 2003). 
 
Compared  with  the  Paraguayan  situation,  and  based  on  our  principal 
component analysis, physical infrastructure in Uruguay does not appear as a crucial 
disadvantage  in  their  perception  of  the  notion  of  asymmetry.  Indeed,  and  as  it  is 
observed  in  the  ranking,  Uruguay  counts  only  two  departments  (Cerro  Largo  and 
Rivera), in the group of regions with the most underprivileged physical infrastructure. 
 
Moreover, from a national perspective, in no one of the cases the indicators 
of infrastructure of the two sub-regions described for Paraguay as Border and Interior 
outperform their less developed peers in each of the other members –the North-western 
sub-region for Argentina, the sub-regions of North and Northeast for Brazil, and the 
lowest  relative  economic  developed  region  in  Uruguay.  Building  upon  the  results 
revealed by the principal component analysis, everything thus seems to indicate that the 
vast majority of regions in Paraguay would be in a condition to qualify for financial aid 
from the FOCEM, while a less developed criterion in terms of physical infrastructure, in 
view of the same results, can be regarded as a fragile argument to address the issue of 
asymmetries in the Uruguayan case. 
 
This preliminary conclusion is, to a certain extent, confirmed in the light of an 
official document produced by the Uruguayan government under the name “Uruguay 
                                                 
 “Las Asimetrías en el MERCOSUR desde la Perspectiva de Paraguay”, MERCOSUR/LXIV GMC/DT N° 16/06.  
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and MERCOSUR”
7. In this document, Uruguay unveils its interpretation and proposals 
to address the asymmetries and smooth market access. With the exception of only one 
point of coincidence with the Paraguayan document, which stresses the small size of 
the domestic market as a major source of asymmetry, the Uruguayan perception of the 
notion of asymmetry outlines other causes of weight and it is in essence quite distant 
from the Paraguayan vision. 
 
In  a  small  economy  like  Uruguay,  the  achievement  of  efficient  scales  of 
production is closely linked to access to export markets, in other words, any sustainable 
growth strategy for Uruguay is doomed to failure if not accompanied, at the same time, 
by a competitive insertion in both intra and extra MERCOSUR markets. 
 
In the Uruguayan view the main cause of its asymmetry is not fuelled by the 
classic shortcomings of the physical infrastructure but come, above all, from the high 
degree of uncertainty that characterises MERCOSUR policies. Uruguayan aspirations 
do not go beyond merely requiring compliance with agreed targets and measures to 
address  the  institutional  deficit,  to  deal  with  the  problem  of  non-tariff  restrictions,  to 
eliminate policies that distort trade and investment location, the coordination of financial 
and  macroeconomic  policies  and  the  develop  of  an  agenda  of  productive 
complementarities among MERCOSUR partners. 
 
Returning to asymmetries based on physical infrastructure inequalities, the 
identification of regions in Paraguay, with a clear deficit in this aspect, should be dealt 
with  even  greater  refinement.  In  this  regard,  and  because  of  the  dual  economies 
existing  in  various  Paraguayan  departments,  it  would  be  possible  to  identify 
departments within sub-regions with distinct development characteristics. For example, 
the  Alto  Paraná  region,  characterised  by  a  disintegrated  development,  has  both 
agricultural areas that produce commodities and subsistence crops. At the same time, 
re-export activities can be observed, as well as parallel economies without production 
chains. This dualism is a structural feature of the society and the Paraguayan economy, 
almost equally divided in terms of inhabitants between the rural and urban areas. 
 
Finally, the analysis in this section enables to advance some major ideas 
regarding the criteria to apply for the allocation of funds: 
 
a) The amount (annual) of net transfers established by FOCEM for Paraguay 
(48 million) and Uruguay (32 million), does not seem to find support in the principal 
component analysis for the physical infrastructure. The balance should be tilted sharply 
toward the Paraguayan side. 
 
b)  Since  the  allocation  criteria  of  the  European  Cohesion  Funds  are  not 
immediately applicable to the MERCOSUR framework, in the case of Paraguay it would 
not be reasonable to allocate funds to the most backward regions, with reduced levels 
of  economic  activity  and  without  export  potential.  This  would  be  a  mere  "ugliness 
                                                 
7 “Uruguay y el MERCOSUR”, MERCOSUR/LXV GMC/DI Nº 16/06.   
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contest"  to  attract  funds  and  produce  a  negligible  return.  Rather,  the  objective  of  a 
sound  regional  development  policy  should  be  to  help  the  regional  development  of 
wealth-creating areas (e.g. the most dynamic areas in the Paraguayan border) and not 
to  divert  economic  activity  from  a  relatively  prosperous  region  to  another  less 
developed, isolated and with a tiny chance of generating sustainable exports. 
 
4.3 Helping the Poor, Supporting the Advanced Regions? 
 
The preceding statement seems, at first glance, to contradict the widely held 
view regarding the expected destination of the funds for convergence between regions. 
This theme, related to increased channelling of funds to regions that concentrate more 
economic  activity  („local  cores‟)  in  relation  to  those  with  less  advanced  economic 
development („local peripheries‟) has been subject to treatment in the literature and do 
not contradict, in any way, the principal objective of the fund, that is to say, to help to 
reduce imbalances between MERCOSUR regions. 
 
This would indicate that the regions can not be interpreted as islands in itself 
but  as  belonging  to  a  system  of  core  and  periphery.  In  this  sense  the  location  of 
activities in centres entails a trickle down effect as a result of so-called externalities of 
agglomeration, which could result in benefit of the areas adjacent to centres and located 
in the peripheries. In other words, the recognition of the existence of centre-periphery 
structures within regions is an important element in the decision to allocate funds to 
stimulate regional growth poles, while allowing, at the same time, an improvement in the 
development of poorer regions. 
 
The logic of the exposed reasoning reinforces the choice of the methodology 
used in our attempt to arrive at objective criteria for the allocation of funds. The choice 
between equity and efficiency is addressed through an analysis in two stages: a) a first 
attempt  which  seeks  to  capture  the  notion  of  inequality,  and  focuses,  thus,  in  a 
comparison of the MERCOSUR regional inequalities based on a summary measure of 
the degree of development in infrastructure, and b) a second one, in order to capture 
elements from efficiency (competitiveness), which aims to identify products/sectors with 
export potential. 
 
Having  identified  priority  regions,  the  next  step  is  the  identification  of 
sectors/products  with  opportunities  within  each  region.  The  main  idea  is  to  select 
products  exported  by  Paraguay  and  Uruguay  with  sustainable  opportunities  and 
determine the extent to which interventions with a direct impact on competitiveness – in 
the case, improvements in physical infrastructure, or a reduction in transport costs  - 
would be able to improve their export position and thus contribute to the development of 
the region to which they belong.  
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5.  PRODCUCTS: EXPORT POTENTIAL 
 
Using  the  latest  available  data,  we  study  the  export  performance  of 
MERCOSUR  regions  between  2003  and  2005,  a  period  for  which  most  of  relevant 
variables  have  statistical  coverage.
8Consider  a  dynamic  version  of  the  following 
















rst P b E b v b b b t b G b b X ln ln ln ln ln ln 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0                     (2) 
The description of the variables in gravity model (2) is as follows: 
j
rst X   is the logarithm of value of exports of commodity  j  shipped from  the 
region r to partner s in year t. Bilateral exports were obtained from various sources. In 
the case of Argentina, the data was provided by the National Institute of Statistics and 
Censuses  (INDEC)  of  Argentina,  in  the  case  of  Brazil  the  database  is  from  the 
Secretary of Foreign Trade (SECEX) of the Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e 
Comércio (MDIC) of Brazil.
9 
Aggregate exports from COMTRADE were used for the case of Paraguay 
and Uruguay. However, since it was not possible to obtain detailed informa tion of 
regional exports, by departments, both Paraguay and Uruguay are considered as 
regional units in the gravity equation. In this context, countries/regions considered as 
„reporting  units‟  in  estimating  our  gravity  model  amounted  to  53  (24  provinces  in 
Argentina, 27 states in Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay). 
 
j
rt G ln  is the logarithm of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of each regional 
exporting unit (province, state, country) considered in this study. The data was provided 
by  the  Ministry  of  Economy  in  the  case  of  Argentina;  The  Brazilian  Institute  of 
Geography and Statistics (IBGE) in the case of Brazil. For Paraguay and Uruguay, the 
data was gathered from international statistics published by the World Bank. 
 
j
rst, Accounts for policy barriers measures (e.g. tariff barriers, non -tariff and 
technical barriers). Nevertheless the lack of systematic information about domestic 
policies, together with the absence of a complete and updated time series of the 
commercial  impediments  levied  by  the  partners,  the  inclusion  of  this  variable  for 
estimation purposes was impracticable. 
 
j
rst   represents the transportation costs to ship the product  j from region r in 
country s in year t, or „transport infrastructure‟. Trying to depart as little as possible from 
our model, and relying on some information about modes of transportation and border 
crossings  in  the  country,  we  created  an  original  proxy  variable;  We  considered  the 
construction  of  a  variable  representing  transportation  costs,  rs,  or  „transport 
infrastructure‟, including both the notion of internal and external distance. This means 
                                                 
8 This is not the case for previous years, for which a lot of statistical information is not available. 
9  The Secretariat of Foreign Trade has an integrated system called ALICEWEB http: //aliceweb.desenvolvimento.gov.br, which 
allows querying detailed but limited exports for that reason it was necessary to request special access to information direct ly with 
the SECEX.   
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that,  beyond  the  common  distance  from  the  export  port  to  destination,  the  distance 
within the country, from the producing region to the export gateway was included. This 
is crucial not only for a landlocked member as Paraguay, but also for vast territories like 
Argentina and Brazil for which internal distances are not negligible at all.  
 
To  compute  the  internal  distance  we  relied  on  the  basis  of  information 
collected in identifying the point-to-point paths, till the exporting gateways, for different 
types  of  commodities.  Accordingly,  information on both  latitude and  longitude  of  the 
output nodes as well as the capital cities of the economic units under consideration was 
used. In the case of Brazil, the identification of gateways for product by destination did 
not posed many problems because the export databases containing such information 
was available. In the case of Argentina, we made use of a complementary database, 
which  was  provided  by  the  Centre  for  Studies  of  Argentina‟s  Production  (CEP). 
Information  on  the  exit  gateways  per  product  depending  on  destination  was  not 
available in the export datasets for the cases of Uruguay and Paraguay. To deal with 
this issue we made a thorough and detailed analysis to identify the exit points of the 
products  selected  for  this  study.  In  the  case  of  Paraguay,  we  used  an  additional 
database provided by the Central Bank of Paraguay which facilitated the mapping of 
exports  by  product  according  to  mode  of  transportation  used.  This  information  was 
combined with information from production areas, roads, airports and ports available 
from  different  sources.  Similarly,  in  the  case  of  Uruguay,  we  used  basically  export 
information from ports collected by the National Ports Administration (ANP). Moreover, 
for the purpose of correcting any biases in the calculation of the internal distance for the 
cases  of  Paraguay  and  Uruguay,  only  those  departments  concentrating  most  of the 
economic activity were considered 
 
h
rs are the other  geographical and cultural  determinants of bilateral trade, 
such as contiguity, common language and isolation. These variables are represented by 
dummy variables.. 
 
rt v is the price of infrastructure services. As these prices are not available at 
the  required  level  of  geographical  disaggregation,  we  adopt  a  “proxy"  variable  as 
suggested and implemented by Hanson and Xiang (2004), e.g. factorial supply of these 
resources in the region. It is further noted that this 'solution' is in line with those studies 
which have attempted to measure the impacts of infrastructure improvements on trade, 
reviewed in section 2. 
 
j
st E   are  expenditures  on  good  j  in  region  s  during  year  t.  Since  it  is  not 
possible to find information on this variable for each partner and year, the national GDP 
is taken as proxy.Accordingly, GDP data from the international statistics published by 
the World Bank is used. 
 
j
st P  is the price index of the commodity j. To represent this variable in gravity 
equation,  several  authors  –Combes  et  al.  (2006),  Baldwin  and  Taglioni  (2006)  and 
Shepherd  and  Wilson  (2006)  among  others–  suggest  the  following  alternatives:  a) 
separately estimate the nonlinear price index, b) use direct measures of such an index,  
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which,  however  could  differ  crucially  on  its  theoretical  definition,  and  c)  replace  the 
Index by a dummy variable with temporal variation by country. In this work, however, we 
are forced to omit this variable  because of lack of information. 
 
To conclude, the computation of each variable, albeit many difficulties, tries 
to deviate as less as possible from the essence of model (2). In the event that the 
available  information  does  not  exactly  match  the  theoretical  definitions,  we  tried  to 
select “proxy” variables for which a consensus has been reached in the literature. In the 
absence  of  any  consistent  or  reliable  information,  the  omission  of  the  variable  was 
decided.  Thus,  it  should  be  noted  that  both  the  omission  as  well  as  the  imprecise 
measurement  of  some  variables,  such  as 
j
rst t   and 
j
st P ,  may  affect  the  obtained 
estimates, introducing some biases. The final specification estimated was: 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ln _ lg _ lg _ l _ l _ _ rst Exp ij b b dp i b dp j b dist ii b dist ij b INFRA b Bord b Locked i
                                                                                                                                           (3) 
5.2.   Results of the Simulations 
 
Table 1 shows the selected products with export potential for Paraguay and 
Uruguay. The regression results for ten of them are presented in Table A.2.1 in Annex 
A.2. The signs and the value of the coefficients, obtained by OLS and a classic pool and 
panel data with random errors, are generally acceptable, especially considering that 
these are not traditional gravity equations where export are aggregated in a total with no 
product distinction at all. The regressions by product imply a more refined construction 
of the variables where it is not always possible to collect information at compatible and 
uniform levels of classification and characteristics for products and industries, resulting 
in a complex interpretation of the results. 
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Table 1   List of selected products 
  
Cod Prod Description 
01122 Meat of bovine animals, frozen....boneless
08131 Oilcake and other solid residues (except dregs), whether or not ground or i
01112 Meat of bovine animals, fresh or chilled....boneless
61142 Other bovine leather and equine leather, without hair on ....parchment-dres
42111 Crude oil, whether or not degummed
61141 Other bovine leather and equine leather, without hair on ...tanned or retan
04231 Rice, semi-milled or wholly milled, whether or not polished, glazed, parboi
89319 Articles for the conveyance or packing of goods, n.e.s.; stoppers, lids, ca
26873 Wool tops and other combed wool
02499 Other cheese
02222 Milk and cream, in solid form, of a fat content, by weight, exceeding 1.5%
65771 Wadding of textile materials and articles thereof; textile fibres not excee
06111 Cane sugar, raw
29193 Guts, bladders and stomachs of animals (other than fish), whole and pieces
82119 Parts of the seats of subgroup 821.1
01212 Meat of sheep, frozen
55421 Organic surface-active agents, whether or not put up for retail sale
42171 Crude oil of Rape, colza or mustard
63431 Plywood consisting solely of sheets of wood...with at least one outer ply o
28239 Ferrous waste and scrap, n.e.s.
24615 Wood in chips or particles....non-coniferous
03428 Other fish, frozen (excluding livers and roes)
62111 Compounded rubber, unvulcanized,....compounded with carbon black or silica
24752 wood....of other non-coniferous species
42151 Crude oil of Sunflower seed
55132 Other essential oils
05711 Oranges, fresh or dried
65422 Fabrics, woven, containing 85% or more..of combed wool or of combed fine an
78435 Drive-axles with differential, whether or not provided with other transmiss
24502 Wood charcoal (including shell or nut charcoal), whether or not agglomerate
Note: This list based on a selection criteria outlined by the authors 
Product codes refer to SITC rev.3,  COMTRADE-databases extracted from WITS system  
As  an  example  of  the  interpretation  of  the  results,  we  select  a  particular 
product, sugar cane – 06111, and proceed with the comments on the coefficients to 
explain the degree of variability of exports (see Table A.2.1 (final)). 
 
The variable that captures the purchasing power or market size of the trading 
partner (lgdp_j) has the expected sign and a high significance level. Sugar cane is an 
important  input  market  in  developed  countries  with  temperate  climates  and  is  an 
alternative to the more traditional sugar beet, as in the case of Europe. The variable that 
captures the importance of the size of the producing region (lgdp_i) as a determinant of 
exports has a negative sign and a high significance. This result could indicate that the 
regions concentrating the exports of such products are often not the most economically 
developed,  but  those  characterised  by  a  weak  level  of  economic  activity,  with  a 
production mode typical of a rural setting. The same interpretation could be made of the  
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variable which captures the fact of being a landlocked exporting region, which seems to 
be a feature of exporting regions of sugar cane in our sample. 
 
The variables which capture the importance of distance (the internal ldist_ii 
and external ldist_ij) as a proxy for transport costs, are significant and with the expected 
sign.  This  would  indicate  that  poor  access  to  export  output  gateways  is  equally 
important, when compared to the classical distances between the export gateway and 
the final destination, and acts as a brake on export potential. 
 
Simulations where then performed, for each good selected for Paraguay and 
Uruguay, supposing an improvement in 20% in the value of the infrastructure index. The 
results of the simulations are presented in Tables 2 and 3, which contain a ranking of 
the most benefited exports as a result of the improvement in physical infrastructure. 
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*04231 Rice, semi-milled 2004 BRA 3,504.90 1,355.35 2,149.54 159% 100% 159%
*06111 Cane sugar, raw 2005 USA 29,700.23 13,899.11 15,801.12 114% 82% 93%
*55132 Other essential oils 2004 BRA 7,436.92 3,763.02 3,673.90 98% 79% 77%
*02499 Other cheese 2004 BOL 635.31 477.19 158.12 33% 100% 33%
*55132 Other essential oils 2004 FRA 785.42 396.52 388.90 98% 8% 8%
*55132 Other essential oils 2004 USA 551.74 278.25 273.49 98% 6% 6%
*06111 Cane sugar, raw 2005 ITA 1,666.39 778.90 887.50 114% 5% 5%
*06111 Cane sugar, raw 2005 BEL 1,483.32 693.22 790.10 114% 4% 5%
*06111 Cane sugar, raw 2005 NLD 1,121.69 523.97 597.72 114% 3% 4%
*06111 Cane sugar, raw 2005 DEU 1,100.36 513.99 586.37 114% 3% 3%
*55132 Other essential oils 2004 DEU 324.58 163.28 161.30 99% 3% 3%
*55132 Other essential oils 2004 BEL 324.18 163.08 161.10 99% 3% 3%
*06111 Cane sugar, raw 2005 GBR 847.51 395.65 451.86 114% 2% 3%
*06111 Cane sugar, raw 2005 DNK 288.45 134.00 154.45 115% 1% 1%
Elaboration: the authors
1. Estimated exports of the product per year and trading partners, due to improved infrastructure index by 20% (thousands U.S. $)
2. Eexports recorded by year and  and trade partner, in thousands of U.S. dollars 
3. Gross increase in exports by changes in the Infrastructure Index 
4. Percentage increase in exports by changes in the Infrastructure Index
5. Percentage share of the product in the indicated indicated related to the sum of exports 
of this product in relation to the selected markets in the study 
6. Relative increase in exports to the partner identified on the basis of their participation in the markets analysed 
Impact on exports derived from changes in the index of regional infrastructure
Exports of Paraguay - Main selected products
 
 
The  difference  observed  between  the  results  for  Paraguay  (Table  2)  and 
Uruguay (Table 3) is due to a greater diversification, by country of destination, for the 
Uruguayan case and a less pronounced effect on the export increases (absolute and 
relative increases set out in columns 8 and 10) as a result of an improved infrastructure 
in the case of Uruguay. The latter would indicate that the largest relative increases in 
Paraguayan  exports  are  explained  by  the  existence  of  a  weak  infrastructure  as 
compared to Uruguay. 
 
In  the  case  of  Paraguay,  the  main  products  are:  unrefined  sugar  cane 
(06111), semi-processed or prepared rice, polished or not, glazed (04231), other types 
of  cheese  (02499)  and  other  essential  oils  (55132),  among  which  we  can  find 
peppermint  and  the  “Japanese”  variety  (being  the  Brazilian  market  the  main 
destination). The largest Uruguayan export increments are observed in the following 
products: meat and frozen boneless bovine (01122), bovine meat not frozen, boneless 
(01112), other bovine and equine leather parchment (61142) and guts, bladders and 
stomachs of animals (except fish) (29193). 
 
Further  dealing  with  the  example  of  the  sugar  cane,  and  due  to  the 
importance of this product among the list of sectors with greater export potential in the 
event  of  improvements  in  physical  infrastructure  investment,  we  proceed  a  deeper 
analysis on the characteristics of the sugar cane production in Paraguay. The basic idea 
is  to  determine  a  regional  mapping  as  reliable  as  possible  in  order  to  match 
sectors/products with regions in MERCOSUR.  
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The emergence of sugar cane in a privileged position in our ranking is not 
accidental. The product is not the traditional sugar cane but the ecological variety of this 
product. Paraguay was the first nation in the industrial production of organic sugar and a 
leader in the worldwide market for this product. The organic sugar is exported to the 
major centres of global consumption, in North America and Europe, where its price is 
higher (a ton of organic sugar is priced at about $ 330, while $ 260 is the price paid for 
common sugar). 
 
A glance back at the tables in Annex A.1 identifies the department of Guairá 
–heart of the production of sugar cane in Paraguay– as ranking in the 61
st place out of a 
total  of  87  regions.  When  compared  to  the  whole  of  the  MERCOSUR  region,  this 
department  can  be  considered  as  relatively  disadvantaged  in  terms  of  physical 
infrastructure.  However,  with  the  exception  of  the  region  that  combines  both  the 
department of Asuncion Central and Misiones (near Guairá in the ranking), it comes out, 
within the context of Paraguay, as one of those enjoying a better position in term of 
physical infrastructure. 
 
The  department  of  Guairá,  with  a  population  of  more  than  180,000 
inhabitants  is  part  of  the  corridor  that  traverses  the  country  from  east  to  west, 
concentrating  two-thirds  of  the  Paraguayan  population  and  considered  as  the  most 
economically dynamic region of the country. It has been estimated that more than half 
the population of Guairá is related directly or indirectly to this sector. In addition, the 
acreage of sugar cane cultivation amounted to 23,000 hectares, with districts in which 
the area of cultivated land reached 60% or more, such as Mauricio Jose Troche, Borja, 
Itapé, Iturbe, Félix Pérez Cardozo and Mbocayaty. 
 
The sugar cane mills not only receive and collect the raw material of its own 
department, but neighbouring or nearby departments too, as is the case of Paraguari, 
Caazapa,  Caaguazú  and  Cordillera,  which  extend  the  benefits  of  improved  export 
performance in the sector beyond the borders of Guairá. 
 
In line with the above reasoning and following the recent evolution in terms of 
regional  policies,  the  mapping  „Guairá-organic  sugar‟  provides  a  valuable  clue  that 
achieves  a  balance  between  the  concepts  of  fairness  (equity)  and  efficiency 
(competitiveness). It is important to stress that though relatively well endowed in terms 
of infrastructure, Guairá exhibits relatively high poverty records (45% of its population 
considered poor). 
 
In this regard, the strengthening of the agro-organic sugar cane system as a 
development  strategy  in  the  region  (extended  to  neighbouring  departments  as 
mentioned  above)  deserves  consideration.  The  last  ten  years  have  witnessed  in 
Paraguay  the  shift  from  a  traditional/marginal  agricultural  system  and    labour  to  an 
organic  and  sustainable  system,  comprising  approximately  1200  “ca￱icultores”, 
internationally integrated, that is globalised and with established and solid international 
partnerships, a key element to guarantee access to markets and technology. In this   
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sense, the role that physical infrastructure plays in regional development and indirectly 
in improving the competitiveness of sectors with export potential is far beyond doubt. 
 
Although everything seems to indicate that the boom of the sugar cane would 
naturally  spill  over  all  involved  stakeholders  in  the  sector,  the  analysis  of  the 
distributional  impact  of  the  potential  benefits  deserves  special  consideration.  An 
agricultural sector such the sugar cane, located in Eastern Paraguay, is characterized 
by a rural population of very small production family units, with a significant share of 
subsistence production, within the framework of an agricultural economy using limited 
technological means and basically labour intensive. The transmission of international 
favourable  international  prices  down  to  households  will  not  materialise  unless 
appropriate complementary measures are implemented. 
 
That  is  why,  having  identified  sector  and  region,  and  in  light  of  a  clear 
diagnosis of the situation, a criterion of convergence fund allocation should take into 
account an identification of bottlenecks in the price transmission mechanism, in order to 
encourage,  through  the  implementation  of  complementary  policies,  improvements  in 
physical infrastructure, provision of technical assistance and training to farmers, and 
upgrading of marketing systems, among others. This will smooth the pass-through of 
the positive shocks, allowing for a better distribution of the benefits of trade integration 
and liberalization, also to the most disadvantageous sectors of society. 
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*01112 Meat of bovine animals 2004 USA 63,095.20 45,760.01 17,335.19 38% 37% 14%
*01122
Meat of bovine animals, 
frozen....boneless 2004 USA 324,100.85 316,066.20 8,034.65 3% 90% 2%
*01112 Meat of bovine animals 2004 BRA 11,595.84 9,113.73 2,482.12 27% 7% 2%
*61142 Other bovine leather 2004 DEU 41,972.08 39,835.45 2,136.63 5% 34% 2%
*61142 Other bovine leather 2004 USA 34,209.55 32,467.66 1,741.89 5% 28% 2%
*61142 Other bovine leather 2004 CHN 19,744.53 18,738.82 1,005.71 5% 16% 1%
*29193 Guts, bladders 2004 ITA 4,651.60 4,557.26 94.33 2% 35% 1%
*29193 Guts, bladders 2004 DEU 3,230.75 3,164.93 65.83 2% 24% 0%
*61142 Other bovine leather 2004 MEX 8,887.29 8,434.04 453.25 5% 7% 0%
*29193 Guts, bladders 2004 ESP 2,373.55 2,324.93 48.63 2% 18% 0%
*29193 Guts, bladders 2004 FRA 1,420.17 1,390.68 29.50 2% 11% 0%
*61142 Other bovine leather 2004 PRY 4,696.07 4,456.11 239.96 5% 4% 0%
*61142 Other bovine leather 2004 ARG 4,142.23 3,930.45 211.78 5% 3% 0%
*61142 Other bovine leather 2004 FRA 4,019.44 3,813.91 205.53 5% 3% 0%
*61142 Other bovine leather 2004 SWE 2,311.81 2,193.17 118.64 5% 2% 0%
*29193 Guts, bladders 2004 USA 551.78 539.71 12.07 2% 4% 0%
*29193 Guts, bladders 2004 CHN 481.63 470.97 10.66 2% 4% 0%
*01122
Meat of bovine animals, 
frozen....boneless 2004 ESP 11,420.04 11,136.01 284.03 3% 3% 0%
*29193 Guts, bladders 2004 ARG 360.04 351.82 8.22 2% 3% 0%
*61142 Other bovine leather 2004 ITA 1,369.03 1,298.37 70.66 5% 1% 0%
*29193 Guts, bladders 2004 CHL 287.19 280.43 6.76 2% 2% 0%
*01122
Meat of bovine animals, 
frozen....boneless 2004 DEU 5,718.34 5,575.62 142.72 3% 2% 0%
*01122
Meat of bovine animals, 
frozen....boneless 2004 NLD 4,337.68 4,229.18 108.50 3% 1% 0%
*61142 Other bovine leather 2004 BRA 574.24 544.02 30.22 6% 0% 0%
*01122
Meat of bovine animals, 
frozen....boneless 2004 GBR 3,569.65 3,480.18 89.47 3% 1% 0%
*29193 Guts, bladders 2004 PRT 103.04 99.98 3.07 3% 1% 0%
*01122
Meat of bovine animals, 
frozen....boneless 2004 BRA 2,908.93 2,835.84 73.09 3% 1% 0%
*01122
Meat of bovine animals, 
frozen....boneless 2004 PRT 2,837.69 2,766.37 71.33 3% 1% 0%
*01122
Meat of bovine animals, 
frozen....boneless 2004 FRA 2,762.27 2,692.81 69.46 3% 1% 0%
*01122
Meat of bovine animals, 
frozen....boneless 2004 SWE 2,423.00 2,361.95 61.05 3% 1% 0%
*01112 Meat of bovine animals 2004 DEU 12,266.83 12,247.63 19.20 0% 10% 0%
Elaboration: the authors
1. Estimated exports of the product per year and trading partners, due to improved infrastructure index by 20% (thousands U.S. $)
2. Eexports recorded by year and  and trade partner, in thousands of U.S. dollars 
3. Gross increase in exports by changes in the Infrastructure Index 
4. Percentage increase in exports by changes in the Infrastructure Index
5. Percentage share of the product in the indicated indicated related to the sum of exports 
of this product in relation to the selected markets in the study 
6. Relative increase in exports to the partner identified on the basis of their participation in the markets analysed 
Exports of Uruguay - Main selected products
Impact on exports derived from changes in the index of regional infrastructure
  
 
From  this  new  angle,  asymmetries  derived  by  processes  of  deeper 
integration or trade liberalisation that result in less desired poverty effects, albeit the 
difficulties  in  establishing  clear  causalities,  are  certainly  an  important  element  to  be 
considered at the time of allocating Fund resources
10. 
                                                 
10 Among the various authors who have developed the theme of the relationship between trade liberalization and poverty in the 
framework of MERCOSUR find: Porto (2003 and 2006), Barraud and Calfat (2008) and Castro and Saslavsky (2006).   
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*02499 Other cheese BOL -98% -152 477,19 100% -98% 2004
*55132 Other essential oils BRA -100% -210 3.763,02 79% -79% 2004
*06111 Cane sugar, raw USA -99% -153 13.528,83 76% -75% 2005
*61142 Other bovine leather URY -100% -159 5.720,19 42% -42% 2004
*01122
Meat of bovine 
animals, 
frozen....boneless DEU -27% -41 2.469,03 36% -10% 2004
*55132 Other essential oils FRA -100% -155 396,52 8% -8% 2004
*29193 Guts, bladders  DEU -100% -155 194,10 7% -7% 2004
*29193 Guts, bladders  ITA -100% -155 184,26 7% -7% 2004
*55132 Other essential oils USA -99% -154 278,25 6% -6% 2004
*29193 Guts, bladders  ESP -100% -155 123,17 5% -5% 2004
*06111 Cane sugar, raw BEL -87% -134 940,31 5% -5% 2005
*06111 Cane sugar, raw ITA -72% -112 976,53 6% -4% 2005
*55132 Other essential oils BEL -100% -154 163,08 3% -3% 2004
*29193 Guts, bladders  USA -100% -155 62,65 2% -2% 2004
*06111 Cane sugar, raw NLD -72% -111 465,09 3% -2% 2005
*01112 Meat of bovine animals DEU -100% -151 396,48 1% -1% 2004
*06111 Cane sugar, raw DEU -29% -45 281,49 2% 0% 2005
*55132 Other essential oils DEU -7% -11 163,28 3% 0% 2004
*01112 Meat of bovine animals IRL -100% -151 15,50 0% 0% 2004
Elaboration: the authors
1 . Percentage decrease of internal distance due to improved infrastructure index by 20% (thousands US $ ).
2. Decrease of internal distance expressed in kilometers
3. Exports recorded by year and trade partner, in thousands US dollars
4. Percentage share of the product in the indicated market related to the sum of exports of this product in realtion to the selected
markets in the study
5. Relative decrease in internal distance identified on the basis of the volume of exports to the partner analysed
Effects on internal distance derived from changes in the index of regional infrastructure
Exports of Paraguay - Main Selected Products
 
 
To  complement  the  simulations  on  the  effects  derived  from  infrastructure 
improvements,  an  equivalent  measure  of  this  impact  expressed  in  the  form  of  a 
reduction of the internal distance in the transportation of the selected goods to its export 
gateways can be computed (Table 4). It should be noted that these results ought to be 
interpreted  with  caution  because  the  calculation  of  internal  distances  for  both  the 
Paraguayan and Uruguayan case requires still refinement. The database for the export 
gateways has not yet been formalized, and in most cases is still missing. In this regard, 
although the work to identify the point-to-point paths was extremely dense, we believe 
that the assembly of these databases is crucial in the analysis of transportation costs, 
and constitute a research project in itself. 
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Having made this provision, the results for Paraguay, presented in Table 4, 
suggest the evidence of a significant volume effect in reducing the internal distance in 
response to changes in infrastructure. This confirms the importance that cargo volume 
has  as  a  crucial  determinant  in  the final transportation  cost,  considering  the  natural 
geographic barriers faced by the country for the shipping of goods. 
 
In the case of Uruguay, due to greater diversification of their exports and 
increased  availability  of  air  cargo  and  sea port facilities,  the  effects  of  infrastructure 
improvements are less influenced by the size of the exports. The results in the case of 
Uruguay  (not  shown)  tend  to  favour  products  whose  main  customers  are  in 
MERCOSUR, the U.S. and Germany. 
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5.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
We have put forward a proposal with two well-defined steps. In the first one, 
and to produce a global idea of target sectors in the bloc at stake, spatial units are 
ranked according to an infrastructure index (encompassing, in the case study, data on 
roads, electricity consumption and telephone/telecoms network). Then, for one or two 
most disfavoured members – hosts to the greatest number of backwards units, based 
on a series of indicators, the most competitive exports (at the 5-digit level of the SITC-
version  3  classification) are  identified.  Gravity  models are  estimated for each  of  the 
correspondingly chosen exports. In each regression, observations are composed by all 
members in the bloc exporting the selected good, acting as reporting units. 
 
In  a  second  step,  simulations  are  performed,  for  each  selected  good, 
supposing  an  improvement  in  20%  in  the  value  of  the  infrastructure  index  of  the 
exporting  regions/provinces  in  each  country.  This  allows  the  identification  of 
sectors/products  where  investment  in  the  related  infrastructure  would  be  more 
rewarding, in terms of enhancing the country‟s exports revenues. Though exports data 
are not usually disaggregated by provinces, for the usually small members at stake, 
location of production centres for each key good can be made. This amounts in turn to 
identify provinces, whose infrastructure has been assessed in the first step. This closes 
the  logic  of  the  exercise,  producing  a  set  of  goods/provinces  where  investment  in 
infrastructure should be directed to. 
 
In the early years of its existence, FOCEM, our case study, has been mainly 
focused in financing activities within the framework of a structural convergence notion, 
aimed  at  improving  the  physical  infrastructure  of  MERCOSUR  members,  with  less 
relative economic development. Our conclusions point to the added insight in combining 
regional  information  with  trade  performance  parameters.  Priorities  become  thus 
assigned not only in a more encompassing but also in a more realistic way. 
 
The  analysis  of  the  infrastructure  complex  clearly  showed  that  in  60%  of 
Paraguayan  „departamentos‟,  here  included  many  (locally)  considered  as  dynamic 
areas, the worst infrastructure conditions in MERCOSUR are found. Uruguay, on the 
other hand, presents a better overall situation in this aspect, more in the lines of the 
bigger members. This is indirectly confirmed by the simulations based on the gravity 
parameters,  for  products  with  sustainable  export  potential  both  in  Paraguay  and 
Uruguay, which indicate that improvements in infrastructure have much more impact on 
the export performance of the former rather than on that of the latter. Indeed the poor 
Paraguayan conditions seem to amplify the negative effect of its locked-in situation and 
related difficulties in reaching extra-bloc markets. 
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The applied policy conclusion is that FOCEM resources, under the global 
objective of fostering convergence of the members‟ physical infrastructure, should be 
directed, in their totality, to Paraguay, and not be dispersed among all backward regions 
in MERCOSUR. Behind this conclusion lies the belief that a regional development policy 
should aim at helping potential welfare-creating zones and not divert economic activities 
from prosperous or better areas to zones with no growth perspectives at all. 
 
A side result of the work is the clear need to create spatial units similar to the 
NUTS system used by the EU, maintaining and regularly updating a socio-economic 
and physical infrastructure database at each unit‟s level.   
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A.1. INDEX OF INFRASTRUCTURE: RANKING OF REGIONS WITHIN EACH MERCOSUR COUNTRY 
Argentina Brasil Paraguay Uruguay
Infrastruct. Ranking Infrastruct. Ranking Infrastruct. Ranking Infrastruct. Ranking
Index Index Index Index
ACF Ciudad Autonoma de Bs Aires 7.25 1 BDF Distrito Federal 2.68 1 PAC Asuncion_central 1.12 1 UCA Canelones 2.51 1
ACT Chubut 3.92 2 BRJ Rio de Janeiro 1.87 2 PMI Misiones -0.74 2 UMO Montevideo 2.38 2
ANE Neuquen 1.24 3 BSP Sao Paulo 1.63 3 PGI Guaira -0.79 3 UMA Maldonado 1.98 3
ATF Tierra del Fuego 0.79 4 BSC Santa Catarina 1.16 4 PPR Alto Paranß -0.80 4 USJ San Jose 1.64 4
ACA Catamarca 0.65 5 BPR Parana 1.04 5 PPH Pdte. Hayes -0.82 5 UCO Colonia 0.60 5
AAZ Santa Cruz 0.64 6 BRS Rio Grande do Sul 0.74 6 PCD Cordillera -0.86 6 ULA Lavalleja 0.32 6
ASF Santa Fe 0.61 7 BES Espirito Santo 0.53 7 PIT Itapua -0.95 7 URO Rocha 0.08 7
AZA Mendoza 0.44 8 BMG Minas Gerais 0.21 8 PPG Paraguari -0.95 8 UFS Flores -0.03 8
ASL San Luis 0.44 9 BPE Pernambuco 0.21 9 PCG Caaguazu -0.95 9 UTT Treinta y Tres -0.19 9
AOB Cordoba 0.24 10 BMA Maranhao 0.10 10 PNM Neembucu -1.03 10 USO Soriano -0.28 10
ALR La Rioja 0.16 11 BGO Goias 0.07 11 PCP Concepcion -1.03 11 UPA Paysandu -0.35 11
ARN Rio Negro 0.06 12 BRN Rio Grande do Norte 0.05 12 PAM Amambay -1.10 12 UFD Florida -0.35 12
ATN Tucuman 0.04 13 BSE Sergipe 0.05 13 PSP San Pedro -1.22 13 URN Rφo Negro
- 0 . 5 6 13
ABA B u e n o s   A i r e s - 0 . 0 2 14 B M S M a t o   G r o s s o   d o   S u l 0 . 0 3 14 P C I C a n i n d e y u - 1 . 2 2 14 UDU D u r a z n o - 0 . 6 8 14
A L P L a   P a m p a - 0 . 0 3 15 B M T M a t o   G r o s s o - 0 . 2 2 15 P C Z C a a z a p a - 1 . 3 5 15 U S A S a l t o - 0 . 7 5 15
A N N S a n   J u a n - 0 . 0 5 16 BAL A l a g o a s - 0 . 3 0 16 P A P A l t o   P a r a g u a y - 1 . 3 6 16 U A R A r t i g a s - 0 . 8 0 16
A E R E n t r e   R i o s - 0 . 0 9 17 B P B P a r a i b a - 0 . 4 1 17 P B Q B o q u e r o n - 1 . 4 1 17 U T A T a c u a r e m b o - 0 . 8 6 17
A M I M i s i o n e s - 0 . 3 4 18 B C E C e a r a - 0 . 5 6 18 PYF P y _ f r o n t i e r - 5 . 6 7 1 URV R i v e r a - 0 . 9 3 18
A R R C o r r i e n t e s - 0 . 5 9 19 B R O R o n d o n i a - 0 . 6 2 19 PYI P y _ i n t e r - 9 . 7 9 2 UCL Cerro Largo -0.97 19
AJU Jujuy -0.69 20 BAM Amazonas -0.65 20 UR1 U region 1 9.11 1
AHA Chaco -0.83 21 BPA Para -0.68 21 UR2 U region 2 -2.23 2
ASA Salta -0.85 22 BRR Roraima -0.69 22 UR3 U region 3 -4.10 3
AFO Formosa -0.91 23 BAP Amapa -0.71 23
ASE Santiago del Estero -0.96 24 BAC Acre -0.84 24
PMP Pampeana 8.05 1 BBA Bahia -0.90 25
PTG Patagonia 6.64 2 BTO Tocantins -1.00 26
CYO Cuyo 0.82 3 BPI Piaui -1.24 27
NOA NOA -1.65 4 BSE SUDESTE 4.24 1
NEA NEA -2.75 5 BSU SUL 2.94 2
BCE CENTRO-OESTE 2.56 3
BNE NORDESTE -3.00 4
BNT NORTE -5.18 5
Cod Region  Cod Region  Cod Region  Cod Region  
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A.2. REGRESSION RESULTS FOR TEN SELECTED PRODUCTS WITH EXPORT POTENTIAL 
Table A.2.1   Estimations by product (cont.) 
Variable 01112 Carne de bovinos sin congelar y deshuesada 01122 Carne de bovinos ..congelada  y deshuesada 61142 Otros cueros de bovinos y equinos, apergaminados                               o preparados depu?s de cur 04231 Arroz semielaborado o elaborado, pulido o no, glaseado,                             semicocido converti 02499 Otros tipos de queso
GLS Random
lgdp_i  0.65 ***  0.93 ***   0.19 *   0.19 0.13       0.14      -1.35 *** -1.31 ***  -0.52 **   -0.40    
(8.56) (8.01) (1.91) (1.48) (1.43) (1.18) (-4.52) (-2.65) (-2.41) (-1.29)
lgdp_j  0.72 ***  0.97 ***   0.40 *** 0.35 *** 0.28 ***   0.20 **   0.36 *** 0.16      0.57 ***  0.42 ***
(9.31) (9.79) (3.47) (3.18) (4.31) (2.24) (2.8) (0.88) (9.97) (3.55)
ldist_ii  0.06      0.22 ***   0.05     0.05 -0.07       -0.01      0.05     0.39 *    -0.26      -0.16    
(0.79) (3.64) (0.77) (1.48) (-1.29) (-0.34) (0.2) (1.65) (-1.42) (-0.92)
ldist_ij  -0.69 ***  -0.60 ***   -0.30 **  -0.17 -0.21 *     -0.09      -0.23 *   0.16      -0.38 ***  -0.18    
(-6.9) (-5.11) (-2.15) (-0.98) (-1.92) (-0.67) (-1.78) (0.6) (-3.75) (-1.51)
Infra  -0.12 *    0.19 ***   0.29 **  0.40 *** 0.06       0.05      1.35 *** 1.67 ***  0.09      0.54 ** 
(-1.77) (2.73) (2.33) (2.92) (1.05) (0.58) (2.66) (4.05) (0.27) (2.15)
Bord  0.20      1.12       -0.36     0.16 -0.46       -0.19      2.02 *** 2.07 ***  0.55      1.15    
(0.28) (1.35) (-1.19) (0.22) (-1.49) (-0.29) (3.99) (2.65) (1.66) (1.37)
Locked_i 0.18      0.56       -0.19     -0.04 0.09       -0.04      -0.87     -0.87      -0.12      0.25    
(0.71) (1.56) (-0.94) (-0.14) (0.38) (-0.14) (-1.51) (-0.86) (-0.28) (0.44)
Cons  -7.25 ***  -11.08 ***   3.33 **  2.38 5.51 ***   4.88 ***  14.88 *** 11.76 **   8.71 ***  6.69 ** 
(-4.3) (-7.78) (0.98) (1.2) (4.72) (3.11) (4.49) (2.15) (3.55) (1.98)
R
2 0.23 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.10 0.09 0.40 0.32 0.34 0.29
N. obs 557 557 206 206 274 274 73 73 97 97
N groups 227 88 113 32 43
Rho 0.86 0.84 0.89 0.85 0.87
Nota : t-estadístico en paréntesis,: * p-value <.1; ** p-value <.05; *** p-value <.01
GLS Random OLS OLS OLS OLS GLS Random GLS Random GLS Random OLS
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Table A.2.1: Estimations by product 
final)
Variable 02222 Leche y crema, en estado sólido, con un contenido graso,                                      en peso, de mÿs de 06111 Azúcar de caña, sin refinar 29193 Tripas,vejigas y estómagos de animales (excepto de pescado)                                      , enteros y tro 82119: Partes y piezas de los asientos del subgrupo 821. 55132 Otros aceites esenciales
lgdp_i  -1.41 ***  -1.10 ***  -0.41 **  -0.14 ***  0.28 **   0.26      0.29 **   0.37 **    -0.34     -0.27     
(-5.48) (-3.07) (-2.14) (-0.72) (2.2) (1.61) (2.44) (2.15) (-0.98) (-1.16)
lgdp_j  0.01      -0.10      0.35 *** 0.32 ***  0.21 ***  0.24 **   0.70 ***  0.62 ***   0.18 *   0.17     
(0.1) (-0.7) (4.78) (3.15) (2.66) (2.19) (8.51) (5.04) (1.91) (1.31)
ldist_ii  0.17      -0.15      -0.57 *** -0.51 ***  0.02      -0.08      -0.11      -0.10       -0.07     -0.10     
(0.73) (-0.69) (-5.5) (-4.35) (0.28) (-1.49) (-1.43) (-1.04) (-0.86) (-1.28)
ldist_ij  -0.45 ***  -0.46 **   -1.29 *** -0.95 *    -0.14      -0.17      -0.49 ***  -0.39 **    0.23     0.21     
(-4.48) (-2.44) (-3.92) (-3.11) (-1.37) (-0.98) (-4.85) (-2.26) (0.82) (0.75)
Infra  1.21 ***  0.87 **   1.16 **  0.69 *    0.13      0.11 -0.38 ***  -0.29 **    0.90     0.80 *   
(2.85) (2.11) (2.61) (1.93) (0.82) (0.7) (-4.04) (-2.26) (1.54) (1.9)
Bord  -2.44 ***  -2.63 **        0.12      0.10 0.65      0.67       3.08 *** 2.85 *** 
(-3.51) (-2.49) (0.28) (0.15) (1.17) (0.98) (3.96) (2.98)
Locked_i -0.70      -0.51      1.56 **   1.22 *    0.05      0.11 -0.98 ***  -0.48       1.52 *** 1.53 *** 
(-1.23) (-0.66) (2.33) (1.93) (0.2) (0.31) (-3.01) (-1.07) (2.89) (2.6)
Cons  19.71 ***  19.87 ***  19.46 ***  14.18 ***  1.53      0.12 -3.80      -5.41       3.46 *   3.27     
(8.52) (5.11) (5.51) (5.65) (0.94) (0.04) (-1.57) (-1.57) (1.69) (1.52)
R
2 0.36 0.34 0.50 0.47 0.13 0.12 0.30 0.30 0.49 0.48
N. obs 129 129 96 96 220 220 245 245 52 52
N groups 69 48 95 118 25
Rho 0.75 0.79 0.87 0.78 0.51
Nota : t-estadístico en paréntesis,: * p-value <.1; ** p-value <.05; *** p-value <.01
GLS Random GLS Random GLS Random OLS OLS GLS Random GLS Random OLS OLS OLS
   
 
 